In this paper I address the naturalistic assumptions in the contemporary philosophical debate about character. I begin with a brief reconstruction of the controversy between dispositionalists and situationists in moral psychology and then turn to Christian Miller’s recent proposal of a Mixed-Traits approach to character in Section I. Section II raises the familiar problem of explanatory circularity in the appeal to character traits and discusses Miller’s proposed solution in terms of grounding character traits in deeper dispositions to form beliefs and (...) desires. Section III introduces the notion of structural naturalism as the threefold underlying assumption in the contemporary debate. Section IV introduces a personalistic perspective on character following Edmund Husserl’s idea of the personalistic attitude. The following three sections (V, VI, and VII) propose alternatives to the threefold assumption of structural naturalism drawing on the work of Edmund Husserl, Edith Stein and Alexander Pfänder. In the conclusion I recapitulate my argument and emphasize how phenomenology could contribute valuable insights for a radical reconfiguration of the debate on character. (shrink)

The Flusser-Quellen was originally conceived as the first volume of Andreas Müller-Pohle’s Flusser Editions, which should have been published by European Photography in 1996/1997. Klaus Sanders continued working on the text until 2002. The final revised edition, with a new foreword by Daniel Irrgang, has now finally been made accessible on-line by the Vilém Flusser Archive in Berlin.

In der zeitgenössischen Erkenntnistheorie ist die Idee verbreitet, dass der Erwerb von Wissen davon abhängig ist, dass das Subjekt des Wissens an einer bestimmten Lebensform teilhat, die grundlegender als sein Wissen ist. Das ist eine Lesart der Position Wittgensteins, deren exemplarischer Vertreter etwa Stanley Cavell ist. Meine These dagegen lautet, dass die Lebensformtheorie einem erkenntnistheoretischen Dogma aufruht, dessen Überwindung Wittgensteins eigentliches Anliegen war: Es ist das Dogma, dass die grundlegende Bedeutung des Wissensbegriffs in der Beschreibung eines einzelnen Aktes besteht, und (...) nicht in der Beschreibung von etwas, das auf einer logisch anderen Ebene steht: nämlich einer Fähigkeit. Damit soll nicht bestritten werden, dass die Idee einer bestimmten Lebensform wesentlich ist für die Beschreibung erkenntnisfähiger Subjekte. Doch diese ist nicht grundlegender als die Idee des Wissens selbst. (shrink)

Though widely derided by popular psychologists and self-help writers as an emotionally toxic and destructive response, blame has many defenders among contemporary moral philosophers. Blaming wrongdoers has been thought to express deep commitment to moral values and norms, to be intimately bound up with practices of holding others responsible, and to be an important exercise of moral agency. In this paper I push against the grain of such defenses of blame just enough to articulate what seems right in the more (...) popular lines of critique. I distinguish between blame as a reactive attitude and blaming as a speech act, and argue that some disagreement over the value of blame can be explained by the fact that blaming, as a speech act, takes several distinct forms. Critiques of blame, I suggest, properly target what we might call judgmental or strongly verdictive blaming, the sort of blaming that passes judgment on the wrongdoer him- or herself, and treats him or her as deserving of the blamer’s hostile or “punishing” reactions. This kind of blaming, I argue, tends to foreclose engagement in further moral dialogue with wrongdoers, an effect that is particularly destructive in therapeutic contexts. In such contexts, it is often more appropriate—and more constructive—to hold others answerable without blaming them in the strongly verdictive sense. I argue, moreover, that strongly verdictive blame may be similarly destructive outside of straightforwardly therapeutic contexts, and I challenge the idea that there is in any case a sharp or clear dividing line between therapeutic and non-therapeutic responses to wrongdoers. Holding answerable in a non-judgmental mode is a response that may have a therapeutic dimension, but it nonetheless engages a wrongdoer as a moral peer and partner in moral dialogue. This account of non-judgmental answerability, I suggest, captures much of what moral philosophers have taken to be valuable about blame, while accommodating the insights of those who criticize its more toxic forms. (shrink)

This article discusses Charles Taylor's analysis of the ‘politics of recognition’, which reveals that the major versions of the latter share an ideological conception of Eros as a binding, unifying force. Such striving for oneness is seen as key to forming harmonious, just communities and nations, and ultimately global cohesion. I refer to this as the ‘ideology of Eros’. However, Taylor highlights an ironically divisive opposition concerning how to realise such oneness, based on incompatible foundational principles: ‘sameness’ and ‘difference’. Instead (...) of a choice, Taylor opts for the demanding political task of ongoing negotiation between them. I augment Taylor's analysis by re-evaluating the figure of ‘non-recognition’ arising from Lacan's critique of the ‘ideology of Eros’, which is centred on Socrates’ encounter with Alcibiades in Plato's Symposium and to which he adds his notion of genuine love, which affirms an ethic of healthy ‘non-recognition’. I argue that this ethic supports the difficult political task that Taylor rightly calls for. (shrink)

This multidisciplinary work departs from the Marxist materialist tradition by criticizing its logical flaws and its incapacity to work out a naturalistic materialism. Micocci argues that capitalism itself is based on a dialectical intellectuality enforced despite the non-dialectical potentialities present in the material in general. Capitalism, therefore, is a massifying system isolated from nature by an intellectual fiat, and has no capacity for theoretical and technical innovation.

The essay discusses Donald Davidson’s concept of anomalous monism in the framework of Husserlian phenomenology. It develops in four stages. Section 1 is devoted to a critical presentation of the argument for anomalous monism. Section 2 succinctly examines those Husserlian notions that best provide the ground for a discussion parallel to Davidson’s. In Sect. 3, the aporetic status of “mental causation” is analyzed by providing a genetic-phenomenological account of efficient causation. Section 4 draws some general conclusions concerning the kind of (...) efficaciousness that must be attributed to consciousness and discusses the sense in which anomalous monism can be defended in a phenomenological framework, but not in a naturalistic one. (shrink)

Pretendo defender a compatibilidade da concepção de objeto desenvolvida na Dedução Transcendental das categorias do entendimento da primeira edição da Crítica da Razão Pura com as demandas da filosofia crítica, ainda que pese em contrário o uso da expressão “objeto transcendental” por parte de Kant. Sugiro que o uso de tal expressão guarde justamente uma transição entre o conceito de objeto como coisa em si e o novo conceito de objeto do conhecimento em sentido crítico.

This commentary discusses some aspects of Haider’s model of grammar change that are problematic from the perspective of usage-based approaches to language change. These aspects include (i) the postulated equivalence between intentionality and teleology, (ii) the metaphorical nature of Darwinism when applied to other domains, and (iii) the nature of explanations of language change. With respect to (i), it is argued that equating intentionality with teleology disregards the fact that innovation in grammar is not unprincipled like in genes. With respect (...) to (ii), the question is whether a comparison between as different concepts as human behaviors/brains and genes/populations can be considered as more than a metaphor (however powerful). Finally, with respect to (iii), a number of diachronic-typological studies are discussed that concur to suggest that variation in speakers’ verbal productions is largely adaptive, and therefore selection operates on a skewed pool of variants in which non-adaptive/dysfunctional variants are a minority (if any). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Where the “They” LiesFeminist Reflection on Pedagogical InnovationAndrea Janae SholtzAs feminist philosophers attempt to articulate problems of marginalization based on race, class, gender, sexuality, we navigate a complex and confusing set of paradigms of exclusion and inclusion. A significant barrier is that binary logic is difficult to eradicate even in calls for greater inclusivity, and the language and mentality of “us” versus “them,” where “them” indicates an imposing force, (...) social institution, or privileged section of the population “doing” something to the “us” remains. Pedagogically, this poses a difficulty in that, often, we are teaching not the marginalized but those who may feel themselves implicated as the “They.” Either as male, white, financially well-off, American, politically conservative, or some combination thereof, students who are presented with these critical materials many times bridle under the supposed accusing eye of the text. Closing the distance from the immediate rejection of the material and to a genuine encounter is the key issue. The question is how can one thoughtfully model critical practice that engages students rather than constructing them as the “They”?What is the nature of the “They”? How can references to the “They” be anything other than gross generalizations? Martin Heidegger has a robust conceptual understanding of the “They” as an existential possibility of Dasein. Dasein initially, and for the most part, understands itself as composed of everyday interpretations of the world indicative of the “they-self.” Significantly, everydayness also constitutes a mode of relating to others, that of indifference or passing each other by (Heidegger 1996, 116). Heidegger calls this the [End Page 72] inauthentic mode of Dasein, juxtaposing this to Dasein’s authentic existence, which is not simply a move toward a greater individuality but toward the “We.” Aside from providing a theoretical platform for discussing the problematic of the “us/them” binary, the transformation in attunement that leads beyond the “They” toward the “We” has important ethical implications, which I will link to feminist Gloria Anzaldúa’s understanding of mestiza consciousness. Their similarity consists in the emphasis on a new mode of thinking as a necessary condition for moving away from the superficiality of thought that hinders us from truly encountering each other and our world/s.Heidegger argues that we are indebted to a philosophical legacy that takes the subject as the primary basis of analysis, separating it from the surrounding world to determine its traits and characteristics. We are unable to see that a “subject without a world ‘is’ not initially and is also never given” (Heidegger 1996, 109). The “who” of Dasein is never reached, because we fail to think through what it actually means to be in the world. In Being and Time, chapter 4, “Being-in-the-world as Being-With and Being a Self: the They,” Heidegger discusses Dasein as a relational Self. Making sense of the inextricable link between these terms clarifies the “who of Dasein,” and, by association, who the “They” is.Dasein is, first and foremost, Being-in-the-world, where world indicates the referential totality of significance. We are never in the world in isolation, therefore Mitdasein (Being-with-others) is implicit to Being-in-the-world and an existential condition of Dasein. Dasein shares a world (now a Mitwelt) irrevocably. Sharing a world with others seems so obvious that we do not take the time to interrogate what it actually entails. This, in turn, conceals the very effort to understand the “who” of Dasein, requiring analysis of how we are with other Daseins.Heidegger begins by interrogating everyday existence. Heidegger says that deficiency and averageness characterize everyday being with one another and misleads us to interpret Mitdasein as a pure objective presence of several subjects, dividing “us” from them. The subject of everydayness is the “They.” The “They” is typically understood as not myself, but this is where one would be mistaken in terms of Heidegger’s analysis. In a passage crucial to understanding Mitdasein, Heidegger writes, “The ‘others’ does not mean everybody else but me—those from whom the I distinguishes itself. They are, rather, those from whom one mostly does not distinguish oneself, those among whom one is, too” (Heidegger... (shrink)

On a dreary spring morning in late October 2006, two policemen drove their cruiser up Nkonjane Road in the K Section of KwaMashu, a former “Africans only” township about fifteen kilometers northwest of Durban. As the cruiser passed over K Section’s softly sloping hills, two men sat handcuffed together in the back. The officers parked the car in front of a house where a woman had reported being raped a few days prior. Leaving the two suspects in the car, the (...) officers alighted and walked up to the home. After greeting the victim, they asked her to step outside to identify the men. The victim, upon seeing the two men seated in the squad car, loudly screamed that they were the rapists... The crowd... (shrink)

Questo articolo è dedicato al De Aucupio di Pietro degli Angeli da Barga, altrimenti conosciuto come ‘il Bargeo’ (1517-1596), e alla trama di corrispondenze tematiche che questo poema intreccia con la parafrasi degli Ixeutica di Dionisio (III-V sec.), presumibilmente nota al poeta tramite la mediazione di Conrad Gessner. Dopo un’introduzione sui protagonisti della questione, ci si concentrerà su un caso esemplare, corredato di apparato critico, tratto dal De Aucupio, e sulle possibili fonti impiegate dal Bargeo.

A ÉTICA, COMUNICAÇÃO E MÍDIA: A RESPONSABILIDADE MIDIÁTICA SOB O ASPECTO CONSTITUCIONAL.